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1     Introduction 
 
Chinese FDI to Canada has risen from virtually nil in the late 1970s to a record high 
of $14.1 billion1 in 2010, and the implications for Canadian government policy and 
business are profound (Woo & Zhang, 2006). Chinese FDI is sanctioned by China’s 
leadership in its “going global” policy and strongly motivated to seek natural 
resources, capital, new markets, efficiencies, and strategic assets (Zhan, 1995; Zhang, 
2005; Davies, 2010; Wei, 2010; Wei & Alon, 2010; Asia Pacific Foundation of 
Canada (APF Canada) & China Council for the Promotion of International Trade 
(CCPIT), various years). 
     When Chinese FDI swings in with a big wave, it inevitably catches greater public 
attention and raises alarm about issues such as subsidization, transparency, and 
national security for takeovers by Chinese companies, especially state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) (Antkiewicz and Whalley, 2007; Woo, 2009; Massot, 2011). In 
2004, China’s Minmetals Group (a state-owned company focused on minerals and 
other natural resources) bid nearly $6.7 billion and attempted to acquire Noranda, one 
of Canada’s largest mining companies at the time. The acquisition attempt raised 
many concerns in Canada over the Chinese company’s status as a state-owned 
enterprise. Critics claimed that Minmetals had committed human rights and labour 
violations, and the fact that it was based in a so-called “Communist nation” raised the 
spectre of national security concerns (Litvak, 2006). Takeover talks eventually failed, 
due to opposition from labour unions in Canada and the federal government’s 
introduction of Bill C-59, an act to amend the Investment Canada Act, which was 
designed to enable the government of Canada to apply more stringent investment 
screening criteria. 
     The increase in Chinese investment in Canada raises questions for many 
Canadians. How much is it growing and in which sectors is it concentrated? Do 
Chinese companies have specific advantages or disadvantages when they are looking 
for investment opportunities in Canada? What is the impact of growing investment 
from China on Canada-China economic and business relations? 
     This paper aims to discuss and answer these questions by examining the evolution 
of Chinese investment in Canada over the past ten years. It begins with a descriptive 
analysis of Chinese investment in Canada, based on information from Statistics 
Canada. Using survey data (2005-2010)2, the paper illustrates the advantages and 
disadvantages that Chinese companies have for investing in Canada. Using APF 
Canada’s national opinion surveys (2004-2010, the paper also addresses Canada’s 
reaction to Chinese investment at public and policy levels. Finally, the paper 
                                                 
1 Dollar ($) figures are in Canadian dollars unless specified. 
2 The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (APF Canada) and the China Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) jointly conducted these surveys in 2005, 
2006, 2009, and 2010 respectively. The survey was designed to collect data on the 
existing pattern of Chinese outward investment and its likely trajectory in the years 
ahead. Some of the questions about Chinese FDI intentions in the survey do not 
necessary reflect their actual FDI behaviours. It may still be helpful to see a possible 
coming trend, but should not be interpreted as a definite prediction of future Chinese 
FDI behaviours. 
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2     Chinese investments in Canada 
 
In the period of 2000-2010, Chinese investment in Canada witnessed the 
dynamics and its features of can be observed from following perspectives. 
 
2.1     Growing fast but remaining small 
 
Chinese investment in Canada surpassed Canadian FDI in China for the first 
time in 2008, when Chinese FDI reached $5.7 billion (see Chart 1). In 2009, 
Chinese FDI in Canada doubled to $12.9 billion and continued climbing to 
$14.1 billion in 2010. Compared to the $219 million Chinese companies had 
invested in Canada just ten years before, China’s FDI in Canada has multiplied 
63 times, with an average annual increase of 59% (Statistics Canada, 2010). 
     The same trend manifested itself globally and is illustrated in the 2010 World 
Investment Report. In 2008 and 2009, China's FDI outflows rose to US$52.2 
billion and US$48 billion respectively, an increase of 132% and 113%, 
compared to US$22.5 billion in 2007, before the financial crisis. By contrast, 
total global foreign investment decreased by 15% and 51% over the same 
period, while the foreign investment of developed economies decreased by 18% 
and 57%, and the foreign investment of developing and emerging economies 
(excluding China) decreased by 9% and 33%. During the global financial crisis 
period, China was one of the few economies to report positive growth, becoming 
the world's sixth-largest source of foreign investment (UNCTAD, 2010). 
China’s international merger and acquisition (M&A) deals also reached record 
levels in 2010, and outbound M&A by Chinese buyers jumped by more than 
30%. The largest outbound transaction in 2010 was Sinopec’s acquisition of a 
40% equity stake in Repsol YPF Brasil SA for US$7.1 billion 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). 
     While China has recently reported faster growth of its FDI than other 
economies, the total amount represents only 2.5% of Canada’s total FDI in 2010 
(Chart 2). FDI from the United States, for example, stood at $306 billion, 
accounting for 55% of total FDI to Canada, followed by the Netherlands (9%) 
and the U.K. (8%). China is reported as the seventh-largest source country of 
FDI to Canada (See Chart 3). 
 
2.1     Targeting resources but diversifying interest 
 
China’s appetite for overseas assets continues to grow, with energy and natural 
resources as key targets, since the country aims to secure the resources it needs 
to fuel its economic growth. Canada seems like a natural fit for Chinese 
investors. In April 2010, the China Investment Corporation, China’s sovereign 
wealth fund, opened its first foreign representative office in Toronto. Also in 
April 2010, Sinopec, China's second-largest oil producer and largest refiner, 
agreed to buy ConocoPhillips' 9.03% stake in Syncrude Canada Ltd., the largest 
oil sands project, for $4.65 billion. Though not the first, this deal is the richest 
yet for Chinese companies looking for a toehold in the oil sands, the world’s 
biggest oil reserves outside Saudi Arabia. 
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Chart 1     Canada-China two-way investment 
 
 
Source: Statistics Canada. Table 376-0051 (accessed May 2, 2011) 
 
Chart 2     China's share in two-way investment 
 
 
Source: Statistics Canada. Table 376-0051 (accessed May, 2011) 
 
Chart 3     Top 10 FDI countries in Canada: 2010 (C$B) 
 
 
Source: Statistics Canada. Table 376-0051 (accessed May 2, 2011) 
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Other recent oil sands investments by Chinese companies in Canada include the 
following: 
 
 August 2009: PetroChina agrees to buy a 60% stake in two undeveloped oil 
sands properties held by Athabasca Oil Sands Corp. that could eventually 
produce as much as 500,000 barrels per day.3 
 
 April 2009: Sinopec acquires an additional 10% stake in Total SA's 
undeveloped Northern Lights oil sands project.4 
 
 April 2005: CNOOC pays $122 million for 16.7% of privately held MEG 
Energy Ltd., which is developing an oil sands project in northern Alberta that 
could eventually pump up to 210,000 bpd, while other properties in its 
portfolio could eventually produce 500,000 bpd. 
 
 April 2005: Enbridge signs an agreement with PetroChina to ship oil on the 
planned Northern Gateway pipeline, which would take oil sands crude to a 
deepwater port on British Columbia's Pacific Coast (APF Canada, 2006-
2011; Jiang, 2010). 
 
In addition to oil sands and other energy projects 5 , Chinese investments in 
Canada include resources such as the following: 
 
 In July 2008, Jinduicheng Molybdenum Group and Northwest Nonferrous 
International Investment Company of China acquired all of the public shares 
of Vancouver-based Yukon Zinc, a mining company with properties in 
Yukon Territory (Yukon Zinc, 2008). 
 In July 2009, China Investment Corporation (CIC), China’s US$300 billion 
sovereign wealth fund, invested $1.74 billion in Teck Resources (a 
Vancouver-based diversified mining company). 
 
In addition to natural resources, China has acquired high-tech companies (Child 
and Rodrigues, 2005). There is also strong interest in machinery and equipment 
manufacturing and the automotive sector (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). For 
example: 
 
 In June 2001, China’s Worldbest invested $45 million to set up a knit dyeing 
plant in Drummondville, Quebec. At the time, it was China’s largest 
investment in Canada. 
 
 In June 2009, Industrial Commercial Bank of China (a large wholesale and 
retail bank) acquired a 70% stake in the Bank of East Asia’s Canadian assets, 
for $80.25 million. 
 
 In April 2010, Shenzhen-based Huawei (a telecom solutions provider) 
opened its first R&D Centre in Ottawa, creating 70 jobs. 
                                                 
3 The Canadian government offered no opposition to the investment by state-controlled 
PetroChina and formally approved the acquisition in December. 
4 The purchase price has not been disclosed, but brings Sinopec's stake in Northern 
Lights to 50%, after buying a 40% interest in the project in May 2005, for $105 million. 
5 More recent deals are reported by the Globe and Mail (2011, October 12). 
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 In November 2010, Chinese manufacturing firm Daqo Group contributed 
$3.5 million to build a $5 million solar panel assembly plant in a joint 
venture with a Hamilton-based engineering company called JNE Consulting 
(APF Canada, 2006-2011). 
 
Recent APF Canada and CCPIT surveys have tracked similar trends. According 
to the China Goes Global survey, Chinese companies with Canada investment 
plans see economic opportunity in a number of sectors, including manufacturing, 
hotels and restaurants, wholesale and retail shops, financial services, and mining, 
among others (see Table 1). 
 




have intention to 
invest in Canada in 
the next 3 years (%) 
Companies that 
have no intention to 
invest in Canada in 
the next 3 years (%) T-test 
Manufacturing 48.8* 18.8* 6.60 
Hotel and restaurants 14.3* 4.0* 4.26 
Wholesale and retail shops 14.3 13.1 0.30 
Financial intermediation 13.1* 3.9* 3.88 
Real estate and business 
consulting 9.5* 3.4* 2.78 
Water, electricity, gas 
supply 8.3 3.4 2.26 
Agriculture, forestry, animal 
husbandry 8.3 5.6 1.04 
Transport, storage and 
communications 3.6 5.1 -0.62 
Construction 3.6 3.5 0.02 
Mining 3.6 3.1 0.22 
Fisheries 1.2 0.7 0.52 
Note: N=1,105; * indicates statistically significant at 1% level (two sided). 
Source: APF Canada and CCPIT, 2010 
 
In fact, Canada offers unique opportunities for foreign investors, including a 
high-performance economy and an investor-friendly environment. It also fosters 
innovation, has a diversified workforce, and is strategically positioned in North 
America. It offers opportunities for foreign investment in sectors such as 
advanced manufacturing, agri-food, chemicals and plastics, clean technologies, 
information and communications technology, life sciences, and services 
(Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT), 
2010). By the end of 2008, inward FDI in Canada was concentrated largely in 
the services sector (44%), followed by manufacturing (34%) and the primary 
sector (22%) (Acharya et al, 2010). It is not surprising that Chinese investors are 
targeting Canadian resources but also diversifying interest beyond the resource 
sectors. 
 
2.2     One policy, many players 
 
China’s “Go Global” policy and related incentives remain strong influences on 
Chinese companies’ FDI decisions. The policy is encouraged by the central 
government to establish a larger Chinese presence in global business, and 
focuses on foreign acquisitions, brand-building, and boosting international 
competitiveness (Zhang, 2005; 2009). 
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With the support of such a policy, many players are involved in China’s FDI. 
The most prominent player is the CIC, the US$300 billion sovereign wealth fund 
backed by over US$3 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves. Its mission is to 
make long-term investments that maximize financial returns for the benefits of 
its shareholder. Set up in September 2007, CIC has diversified its investments 
strategically at home and abroad. It bought shares in the country’s three largest 
banks, and today owns 35.42% of the Industrial & Commercial Bank of China, 
57.09% of the China Construction Bank and 67.53% of the Bank of China. In 
global markets, CIC has invested US$3 billion and US$5 billion in Blackstone 
and in Morgan Stanley, respectively, US$100 million in VISA, $1.74 billion in 
Teck Resources, and $1.25 billion in Penn West Energy Trust, a Calgary-based 
oil and gas company. Recently, CIC set up an International Advisory Council, of 
which former Minister of Foreign Affairs David Emerson is the only Canadian 
member. In early 2011, its first foreign representative office opened in Toronto; 
it will serve as a platform for deepening business cooperation and relationships 
with local companies and exploring investment opportunities in Canada. 
     Another major player is a grouping of state-owned giants, including the 
following: China Minmetals; Wuhan Iron and Steel, which invested US$240 
million in Consolidated Thompson in 2009; and PetroChina, which recently 
agreed to pay $1.9 billion for a stake in the Northern Alberta oil sands. In 
addition, this group of Chinese multinationals includes CNOOC, Sinopec, 
CITIC, and COSCO. While classified as state-owned enterprises, many of these 
companies are in fact publically owned (Woo, 2008). China Minmetal 
(SS600058) and Wuhan Iron and Steel (SS600005) have been listed and traded 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange since 1997 and 1999 respectively, and 
PetroChina is listed on the Shanghai (SS601857), Hong Kong (HK00857), and 
New York (NYSE:PTR) stock exchanges. As public companies, they have to 
follow international business rules and satisfy shareholders. 
     In addition, there are a number of companies investing in Canada that are not 
state-owned. For example, Shenzhen-based Huawei is a privately owned global 
ICT solutions provider. Huawei opened its first Canadian office in the spring of 
2008. Its headquarters are in Markham, Ontario, and the company has a 
Research and Development centre in Ottawa, Ontario. Huawei has more than 
250 employees in Canada and the company plans to expand its presence in 
Toronto and Ottawa over the coming years (Huawei, 2011). 
     Little Sheep is another interesting case of a Chinese company that is not a 
state-owned enterprise and has expanded its business in Canada. Based in 
Baotou, Inner-Mongolia, Little Sheep was initially a private hotpot restaurant 
with a franchise business. In June 2008, Little Sheep listed in the Hong Kong 
stock exchange (stock code: HK0968) (Little Sheep, 2011). It opened its first 
North American hotpot outlet in Toronto in October 2005 and a second one in 
Toronto a year later. In 2007, it opened restaurants in Vancouver and Montreal, 
and another in Ottawa in 2009. Last year, it opened one in Brossard (Lin, Du, & 
Wei, 2010). 
     Similar stories include Ningbo Sunhu, a supplier of special materials and 
speciality chemicals, which invested $21.8 million for a 15.6% stake in Toronto-
based Royal Nickel in September 2009. There are many others that the Canadian 
public has never heard of.6 
     Apart from actual investments in Canada by Chinese companies that aren’t 
state-owned enterprises, potential non-SOE Chinese investments are likely to 
increase on Canada’s FDI horizon. According to APF Canada and CCPIT 
                                                 
6 See a list of Chinese companies on the website of the Embassy of China in Canada 
(2007). 
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surveys, about four out of five non-SOEs show equivalent enthusiasm to 
outward investment compared to their SOE counterparts (APF Canada and 
CCPIT, various years). 
 
 
3     Chinese FDI in Canada: firm-specific advantage (FSA) or 
disadvantage (FSD)? 
 
What are the advantages or disadvantages that Chinese companies possess when 
they invest in Canada? The international business theories and practices brushed 
a mixed picture of Chinese firm-specific advantages. 
 
3.1     Firm-specific advantage in theory 
 
Traditional internationalization theory suggests that multinational businesses 
face liabilities associated with their “foreignness” when competing against local 
companies (Eden & Miller, 2004; Sethi & Guisinger, 2002; Zaheer, 1995; 
Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). 
     Eden and Miller (2004), for instance, argue that these liabilities can manifest 
themselves in several ways, including a lack of knowledge about local market 
conditions; unfamiliarity with legal, institutional, cultural and language issues; 
increased costs of communicating and operating from a distance, and so on. 
Consequently, if a firm wants to be successful in another country, it must have 
some kind of ownership- or firm-specific advantages (FSAs), such as technology 
or a brand that eliminates some of the costs of operating in a foreign 
marketplace (Dunning 1988; Rugman, 1985). The firm must attain either higher 
revenues for the same costs as local competitors, or lower costs for the same 
revenues. Such advantages must be embodied in the organization of the firm, 
and readily transferable between countries and within the firm (Dunning 1988; 
Rugman, 1985; Wei, 2010). 
     There are studies, however, showing that the internationalization of 
latecomer multinational companies (MNCs) from emerging markets is not based 
on technological and branding resources which can be exploited overseas. 
Instead, the literature shows they enter international businesses to explore their 
needed FSAs by leveraging other advantages (Mathews, 2002; Wei, 2010). And 
recent studies have found evidence that MNCs from developing countries do 
have certain unique advantages, such as cost-innovation capabilities that allow 
them to operate certain types of activities more effectively than local firms and 
industrialized-country MNCs (Dunning, 2006; Wei, 2010). 
 
3.2     Firm-specific advantages and disadvantages for Chinese FDI in 
Canada 
 
What are some of the FSAs that Chinese multinational companies enjoy? As 
relative newcomers, Chinese MNCs do not have traditional FSAs such as 
advanced technology and reputable brands. The most important FSA of Chinese 
MNCs is having access to a large pool of low-cost labour and lower 
manufacturing costs (Wei, 2010). Other home-country-related FSAs include the 
ability to explore personal relationships and business networks, and the dynamic 
capability to operate in environments with uncertain economic and political 
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circumstances (Wei, 2010). The deep pockets7 of Chinese firms also seem to be 
perceived as a new kind of FSA—particularly since the global financial crisis 
(Tudor, 2011). 
     In addition to these scholarly contestations, Chinese companies claim their 
own perceptions of FSAs for investing in Canada. According to a survey of over 
1,000 Chinese companies by the APF Canada and CCPIT (2009), Chinese 
companies believe that their FSAs help them succeed in Canada. Some claimed 
FSAs give them the ability to access global market information and establish 
global sales and distribution networks. What is less valuable to them, they say, is 
taking advantage of low labour costs or tapping into local social and human 
networks (Chart 4). 
 
Chart 4     Perceived advantages for success in Canada (%) 
 
 
Source: APF Canada and CCPIT, 2009 
 
As latecomers, Chinese MNCs often lag behind Western firms in terms of FSAs, 
especially in technology and innovation, managerial capabilities, and marketing 
capacity (Wei, 2010). Instead of FSAs, Chinese firms often face firm-specific 
disadvantages (FSDs) in Western economies. 
     Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and central-government-led 
enterprises (CGLEs) do have certain FSAs, but mainly relative to non-SOEs and 
regional firms in domestic markets. 8  Compared to large well-known 
multinational companies in international markets, Chinese firms’ home-country-
related FSAs become insignificant. Only 54 Chinese companies (mainly SOEs 
and CGLEs) were included in Fortune Magazine’s “Fortune 500” list of 
companies last year—about 10.8%. Of the top 100 non-financial multinational 
enterprises in 2008 ranked by UNCTAD’s World Investment Report, only the 
CITIC Group and the COSCO Group of China were included. For the same 
year, among the top 100 non-financial multinational companies from developing 
countries and transition economies, only 13 Chinese companies (mainly SOEs 
and CGLEs) made the list. 
     Some countries, particularly Western developed countries, are reluctant to 
see Chinese enterprises (especially SOEs) take control of strategic businesses. 
For example, in 2004, China Minmetals’ $6.7 billion bid for Noranda was 
                                                 
7 By the end of June 2011, China's foreign exchange reserves reached USD3.197491 
trillion (State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), 2011). 
8 China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) statistics show that 66.2% of Chinese FDI 
stocks by 2010 were attributed to SOEs. The CGLEs accounted for 77% of the FDI 
stocks (MOFCOM, 2011). 
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rejected. In 2005, CNOOC’s bid for Unocal in the U.S. was turned down. In 
2008, Huawei’s US$2.2 billion acquisition of 3COM Corporation of the U.S. 
was blocked. In 2009, Australia’s Rio Tinto (RTP) turned its back on a US$19.5 
billion investment from Chinalco. 
     Chinese companies face a number of challenges when they invest in Canada. 
The top three are the lack of knowledge about legal and market risks in Canada, 
the lack of international business and management personnel, and the difficulty 
of finding business partners (See Table 2). The liability costs of “foreignness” 
are high for Chinese companies looking to invest in Canada. If Chinese 
enterprises rely solely on their deep pockets backed by official reserve assets, 
rather than on their FSAs, to compete against local competitors, they will face 
extreme difficulties in the Canadian market. 
 




rating (1-5) % 
Lack of knowledge about legal and market risks in Canada 2.81 56.28 
Lack of international business and management personnel 2.74 54.88 
Difficulty of finding business partners in Canada 2.58 51.56 
Local consumer worry about quality and safety of Chinese 
products 2.53 
50.67 
Cultural barriers 2.46 49.13 
Difficulty of getting a visa to Canada 2.40 48.10 
Local consumers are unfamiliar with Chinese brand 2.37 47.39 
Negative reactions by Canadian government 1.90 38.05 
Note: N=59, companies that have had OFDI in Canada   
Source: APF Canada and CCPIT, 2010 
 
3.3     Determinants of Chinese FDI in Canada 
 
Given the coexistence of FSAs and FSDs, what are the factors that really shape 
the decisions of Chinese firms to invest in Canada? The results of APF Canada 
and CCPIT’s (2010) survey illustrate that a larger company is more likely than a 
smaller company to invest in Canada; whether a company is an SOE or not does 
not affect the likelihood of it investing in Canada9; the likelihood of investing in 
Canada is not significantly different among Chinese firms across industries; and 
a Chinese company based in a province with high rates of FDI is more likely to 
consider investing in Canada (See Table 3). 
     A company that has experience dealing with inward FDI in China is 
significantly more likely to invest in Canada than one with no such experience; 
the scale of their existing FDI does not have an effect on decisions to invest in 
Canada; previous FDI experience in the U.S. or Canada also significantly 
increases the likelihood of investing in Canada. 
     Finally, the effect of the home province remains significant; experience with 
inward FDI remains important as companies with no international business 
experience stand out as significant players in making Canada their investment 
destination; existing FDI becomes significant and companies with lower levels 
of existing FDI are found to be more likely to invest in Canada; the effect of  
                                                 
9 What distinguishes the two groups is that SOEs with investment interest in Canada 
have more ambitious overseas investment plans than their non-SOE counterparts. The 
means of intended OFDI scale for SOEs is US$39 million vs. US$12 million reported by 
non-SOEs (APF Canada and CCPIT, 2010). 
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Table 3     Logistic analysis of Chinese companies’ intention to invest in Canada 
 
Factors Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 
Constant -3.17*** -3.08*** -1.83** 
Size of company (reference is "large") 
SME -0.71** 0.01 0.17 
Ownership (reference is "non-SOE") 
SOE -0.17 -0.22 -0.22 
Industry (reference is "manufacturing") 
Agriculture 0.77 0.53 0.00 
Construction and Infrastructure -1.11 no obs. no obs. 
Services 0.03 0.02 -0.48 
Provincial average of intention to 
invest in Canada in next 3 years 14.18*** 10.34* 11.38* 
International business experience (reference is "trade and IFDI") 
Trade only   -0.13 0.07 
IFDI only   2.39*** 3.73*** 
Neither trade nor IFDI   0.52 1.19* 
Existing OFDI scale (reference is less than US$1 million") 
US$1-5 million   -0.32 -1.04* 
US$5-10 million   -0.82 -2.15** 
US$10 million-1 billion   0.64 no obs. 
Over US$1 billion   0.97 -0.05 
OFDI experience in North America (reference is "only in Canada") 
In USA only   1.93** 1.89** 
Neither USA nor Canada   0.38 0.27 
Both USA and Canada   1.99*** 1.95** 
Priority market for OFDI (reference is "local market at OFDI destination") 
North American market    -0.59 
China's domestic market     -0.58 
European market     -1.79** 
Asian market     -1.13* 
Global market     -2.01* 
Others     -0.13 
Statistics 
Number of effective observations 847 313 277 
Pseudo R-Square 7% 19% 26% 
Chi-square 20.35 38.52 48.76 
Note: Specification 1: firm characteristics only; Specification 2: firm characteristics + 
previous experiences; Specification 3: firm characteristics + previous experiences + 
priority market to serve (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01) 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on APF Canada and CCPIT, 2010 
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previous North American investment remains significant; and if the companies’ 
priority market for FDI is outside North America, they are significantly less 
likely to invest in Canada. 
     The above analysis of determinants of Chinese OFDI in Canada suggests 
broader implications for Canadian policy makers, investment promotion 
agencies, business service providers, and the general public. Have Canadians 
reacted to Chinese investment proactively? 
 
 
4     Canada’s reaction to Chinese investment 
 
With the glowing interest of Chinese investment to Canada, Canadian policy’s 
and public’s react to this rising economic power become one of important 
indicators of the Sino-Canadian relations. 
 
4.1     Does Canada welcome FDI? 
 
Canada is one of the major destinations for global FDI. Between 2000 and 2008, 
inward FDI grew by 120%, reaching US$474 billion by the end of 2008. This 
reflects an improved business climate, reduced restrictions on foreign 
ownership, and a prospering economy. The outlook for the future is also 
promising. And the Canadian government has sent strong signals to foreign 
investors that Canada is open for business, by lifting restrictions on previously 
protected sectors and increasing the financial thresholds for the review of 
foreign investments (Acharya et al., 2010). 
     Indeed, the government of Canada is branding the country as a great location 
for business and investment. The Hon. Peter Van Loan, then-Minister of 
International Trade, summarized that Canada offers one of the most attractive 
and low-risk business destinations in the world (DFAIT, 2010). He suggested 
that Canada’s rich diversity, spirit of innovation, and excellent business 
conditions are key drivers of its economy. Some key advantages and 
opportunities that were highlighted include: 
 
 Lowest taxes in the G7 on new business investment 
 
 Lowest debt-to-GDP ratio in the G7 
 
 Fastest economic growth in the G7 for 2011 
 
 World’s soundest banking system 
 
 A “tariff-free zone” for manufacturers by 2015 
 
 The highest proportion of post-secondary graduates in the OECD 
 
 High quality of life 
 
 A commitment to the rule of law and a strong justice system 
 
By 2010, Canada had developed a global network of investment and trade 
professionals, present in more than 150 cities worldwide, to assist investors or 
potential investors in making Canada their next investment destination (DFAIT, 
2010). Canada also has one of the most open regimes for inward foreign 
investment and Canadians generally support foreign investment (Woo, 2008). 
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Yet despite this open environment, many Canadians remain cautious—
particularly when it comes to foreign companies taking over major Canadian 
businesses. There seems to be a significant gap between the government’s 
rhetoric and decisions and the public’s perception when there is a major foreign 
takeover. 
 
4.2     Conflicted and cold sentiments about Chinese OFDI 
 
The rise of China in recent years has changed the landscape of the world 
economy. As China continues to become one of the economic powerhouses in 
Asia—and the world—and looks to invest globally, will it be seen as an 
opportunity or a threat? Many people are worried about increased investment 
from China, especially from SOEs (Shalashniy, 2010). 
     China Minmetals’ failed bid for Noranda in 2004 tells part of the story. The 
Investment Canada Act (ICA) was the first stumbling block. According to the 
ICA, acquisitions that exceed a certain amount10 must be reviewed by Industry 
Canada under the net benefit to Canada requirement and the national security 
criterion.11 The unclear position of the Government of Canada in 2004 made the 
acquisition unlikely. And the mainstream media didn’t help, by talking about 
China’s poor human rights record and emphasizing that Canada’s resources 
should not be sold to Chinese SOEs. Canadian unions posed another challenge. 
In a letter to the prime minister at the time, the National Director of the United 
Steelworkers Union expressed concern about the lack of consultation with the 
Union, given the fact that China Minmentals had only negotiated with 
management (Zhang, 2010). 
 
4.3     Public attitude: turning China’s FSAs to FSDs 
 
Since 2004, APF Canada has conducted national public opinion polling 
periodically (APF Canada, various years). The public opinion polls are a unique 
tool to measure and understand Canadians’ views on Asia, including attitudes 
about Asian investments to Canada. The most recent survey was conducted 
between February 15 and 23, 2011 12. The poll results show five interesting 
findings related to Chinese investment to Canada. 
 
Canadians do not seem to embrace Asia. Canadians are somewhat conflicted 
about Asia and about Canada’s relations with the Asian region. While the results 
show that Canadians increasingly view Asia as critically important both 
economically and politically, many Canadians still do not seem to fully embrace 
Asia’s rise. Indeed, the number of Canadians who perceive China and India’s 
growing economic power as more of an opportunity than a threat has been 
declining over the past few years. 
     These divergent trends suggest that Canadians may be growing uneasy about 
this historic shift in the balance of power and, unsure of how to engage with 
Asia, seem to be reflexively turning inward. For example, 62% of Canadians 
perceive that Asian economies as a whole are vital to the Canadian economy; 
                                                 
10 The amount for the year 2011 is $312 million (Industry Canada, 2011). 
11 Please refer to Woo, 2008; 2009; Murray & Glossop, 2009; Jiang 2010; and Massot 
2011 for more discussion about the ICA and its impact on Chinese SOE investment in 
Canada. 
12In all, 2,926 Canadians participated, resulting in a margin of error of 1.8%, 19 times 
out of 20. 
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nevertheless, the importance that Canadians attach to particular Asian economies 
has declined over the past three years. 
 
Canadians are concerned about China’s rise. While 66% of Canadians believe 
the influence of China will surpass that of the U.S. in 10 years, the number of 
Canadians that view the rise of China as more of an opportunity than a threat has 
dropped from 60% in 2008 to 43% in 2011. In 2008, 59% of Canadians saw 
China as important to Canada’s prosperity, compared to just 44% in 2011. This 
downward trend of Canadians’ attitudes holds true toward all Asian economies 
and, to a lesser extent, toward the U.S. and the European Union as well. 
 
Canadians are cold toward China. The polling results also show that one in 
three respondents describes having cold feelings toward China. Only 10% of 
Canadians feel warmly towards China, India, South Korea, and Southeast Asia, 
compared to the 50% who are favourably disposed towards the United Kingdom 
and 40% who feel warmly about France. 
 
Canadians worry about Chinese investment in Canada. The same polls suggest 
that a majority of Canadians still believe Canada would benefit from more Asian 
investment in Canada. However, there has been a statistically significant drop of 
nine percentage points, from 64% to 55%, in just a five-year period (see Chart 
5). In terms of Chinese investments specifically, the number of Canadians that 
support a Chinese government-controlled entity acquiring a controlling stake in 
a major Canadian company declined from 18% to 16%, a statistically significant 
drop in one year. Compared to other foreign countries, China ranked at the 
bottom of the list for Canadians who are in favour of investment from state-
owned entities from these countries (see Chart 6). 
 
Canadians hold negative image of Chinese products. 
The poll also revealed that 78% of Canadians hold a negative image of the 
quality of food produced in China, and 69% believe that China-made products, 
such as electronics and clothing, are of poor quality. 
 
Chart 5     Canadian opinion poll on Asian investment as a benefit 
 
 
Source: APF Canada, National Opinion Polls 2006; 2008; 2010; 2011 
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Chart 6     Canadian’s support for foreign investment by country (poll) 
 
 
Source: APF Canada, National Opinion Poll 2011 
 
 
5     Concluding remarks 
 
We have reviewed the last ten years of Chinese FDI in Canada and discussed the 
advantages and challenges facing Chinese firms that are operating or considering 
operating in Canada. We also demonstrated that Canada welcomes FDI in 
general, but has conflicted sentiments about Chinese FDI. 
     Early studies have confirmed that a country’s public policies facilitating 
inward and outward FDI, as well as their spillover benefits, contribute to real 
economic growth (Globerman & Chen, 2010). This study further argues that the 
growing and diverse Chinese FDIs in Canada have much broader implications 
for Canada’s public policy and Sino-Canadian economic and business relations. 
     Chinese FDI in Canada is growing at an astonishing rate, but remains 
minimal compared to traditional foreign investors such as the U.S., the 
Netherlands, and the U.K. The importance of Chinese FDI in Canada is on the 
rise, and it is becoming one of the key drivers in Canada-China relations. To 
secure China’s massive appetite for energy and raw materials, its FDI is mainly 
targeted at Canadian energy and natural resource sectors. However, there is 
growing interest beyond resources, including advanced manufacturing, hotels 
and restaurants, wholesale and retail shops, and financial and business services. 
Diversification has also brought more non-state-owned SMEs to Canada. In 
addition, a new breed of publicly listed SOEs is changing the landscape of 
Chinese investment in Canada. Even among the large SOEs that currently 
dominate investment transactions in Canada, their business decisions are likely 
more independent and different from the conventional SOEs, given the fact that 
many of them are publicly owned or backed by regional governments. 
     These changes need to be carefully revisited, as so much of the current media 
focus and business analysis is on Chinese SOEs seeking resources, and the 
diversifying trend of Chinese FDI is often overlooked. At the policy level, 
Canada should keep its business environment open for all foreign investors. 
While every proposed investment from a foreign source should be considered on 
its merits, the Government of Canada should send a strong signal that it 
welcomes Chinese investment in Canada and that the ICA does not discriminate 
against state-owned enterprises (Woo, 2008). One such signal could be an 
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upgrade of the bilateral investment policy framework, from the 2006 China 
investment memorandum of understanding (Government of Canada, 2010) to a 
more comprehensive foreign investment promotion and protection agreement 
(FIPA). 13  On a practical level, investment promotion agencies and service 
providers need to target these diversified players, whether large or small, SOE or 
non-SOE, resource-related or not, when attracting FDI from China. The 
Canadian business community should also prepare for the growing opportunities 
that such diverse FDI may bring to Canada’s various sectors and regions. 
     For Chinese firms, however, the new players (and established investors) will 
need to understand that Canada no longer only looks for more FDI, but for 
sustainable FDI. The negative public perception of Chinese FDI in Canada 
forms a unique brand-based disadvantage for Chinese firms. Chinese companies 
should proactively work on such issues as cross-cultural management and 
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